Jun 14

Jun 14 How to deal with post-Putin Russia By James Bruno

Luke Perry

Commentary

I heard on the radio today the old Scorpions hit, “Wind of Change”:

Listening to the wind of change

The world is closing in

Did you ever think

That we could be so close, like brothers

The future's in the air

Can feel it everywhere

Released in early 1991, and quickly hitting the top of the charts, the song captures the heady, even giddy spirit as communism was folding in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the curtain was closing on the Cold War.

From my perch in the State Department’s European Bureau, for two years I followed intensely the events leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the quick succession collapse of communist governments and the popular stirrings and political machinations resulting in the break-up of the USSR. Late in 1991 the latter was brought home to me up close and personal when, as U.S. representative at UN-sponsored peace talks in Cambodia, I saw that the large red hammer and sickle fender flag on the limousine of Moscow’s envoy was now replaced with a hastily stitched small tricolor Russian flag. Do svidanya communism. Zdrastye — what?

That pretty much has been the key question since Boris Yeltsin prevailed over hardline putschists shortly before the breakup. How Russia defines itself determines how we deal with it, particularly after its inevitable failure in Ukraine and Putin’s departure from power.

Immediately following the Soviet Union’s implosion, Western governments scrambled to assist new democracy-oriented post-Soviet leaders to build civil societies, democratic institutions and make the wrenching transition from a command economy to a free market one. While I believe we made inroads on the former, we largely failed on the latter. Pressing the Russians to move too fast led to the emergence of a corrupt oligarch class, impoverishment of the people and the rise of an ex-KGB officer whose inclinations were anything but democratic or altruistic.

I believe his Ukraine quagmire will constitute Vladimir Putin’s Waterloo. In previous postings, I explained why and how as well as what measures we can take for hastening this outcome, not to mention why Putin must go. Looking ahead, here I put forth some broad ideas on how to deal with post-Putin Russia — bearing in mind I am neither Nostradamus nor a savant.

The manner of Putin’s downfall is important in determining our future dealings with Moscow. Rutgers University professor Alexander J. Motyl foresees two potential scenarios: the Khrushchev variant, after the Soviet leader who was maneuvered out of power by cronies in 1964; and the Yanukovych variant, named for the pro-Russia Ukrainian leader forced from office in 2014 by a popular uprising.

In the Khrushchev variant, Putin’s closest advisers would, together with influential oligarchs, end Russia’s descent into oblivion by arresting Putin. Given the likelihood of his organizing an opposition movement, they might execute him. If that happened, both his supporters and opponents would take to the streets and violence would ensue. Bereft of their leader, however, Putinites likely would lose and withdraw.

In the Yanukovych variant, some random outrage could trigger mass demonstrations involving large numbers of economically impoverished Russians tired of a war-turned-quagmire and the flow of body bags. Putin’s elite supporters would distance themselves from him; sensing that the jig is up, he might be lucky enough to escape capture and flee to some outpost in Siberia. In this scenario, as well, his supporters and opponents would clash violently in the streets.

The remaining members of Putin’s inner circle would jockey for power, try to end the war in Ukraine, and repair relations with the world.

There is, of course, a third scenario: Putin’s health failing. There is much speculation on this, with experts positing he suffers from maladies ranging from Parkinson’s to Asperger’s to cancer to a bad back to just being “rattled.” Barring any hard evidence, we’ll just put this one aside for the time being. That said, however, should Putin end up pounding at death’s door, either of the above two scenarios outlined by Motyl may play out in any case.

Motyl sees the potential for democratic actors to reassert themselves, but also the potential for Russia to splinter and fall into chaos:

In either scenario, the power struggle would enable Russia’s democratic opposition to re-insert itself into politics and possibly gain control of the Kremlin — especially if the street supports them and not the plotters… [T]he resultant disorder likely would persist for several years. And the disintegration of Russia is entirely plausible.

[T]he core of the problem is Putin and the autocratic system he built — and which the world tolerated. Without him, that system likely cannot be sustained and will disintegrate with potentially horrific consequences for the Russians who sustained Putin in power for over two decades.

Obviously, the West’s best interests lie in buttressing the democratic forces, while, at the same time, preventing Russia from falling into a miasma of civil violence and economic collapse, eventualities that could lead to another Putin — or worse —seizing power.

A more contrarian Kremlin-centric view, if you will, comes from Carnegie scholar Tatiana Stanovaya:

There can be only two possible outcomes. Either the West changes its approach to Russia and begins to take seriously the Russian concerns that led to this war or Putin’s regime falls apart and Russia revises its geopolitical ambitions.

At the end of the day, a deal between Russia and Ukraine is only possible as an extension of an agreement between Russia and the West or as a result of the collapse of Putin’s regime.

I have serious problems with Stanovaya’s positions. First, she legitimizes what almost all other serious experts discount: “Russian concerns that led to this war” — like what exactly? NATO “encirclement”? “Nazi” leaders of Ukraine? And second, “an agreement between Russia and the West” merely feeds into the Putin canard that this is a “proxy war” between Russia and the West. These positions are simply non-starters for they distract from the reality of Moscow’s imperialism and aggression against Russia’s neighbors.

The bottom line is this: Without real reforms within Russia, any negotiated “peace” over Ukraine is likely to be fleeting. And for Russia to rejoin the community of nations, Putin’s removal from power is required. But this also entails essential changes in how Russia is governed. And that, again, is where the West can play a key role.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted a major rewrite of the White House’s long awaited National Security Strategy. Early versions placed emphasis on countering Chinese power and influence. Current redrafts reportedly address squarely the danger posed by Russia and the burgeoning relationship between Moscow and Beijing. (I would qualify the latter as the growing dominance of China over Russia.) Were I Biden’s National Security Advisor, I would, after, of course, consulting the president, task the State Department, intelligence community, Treasury Department and Pentagon with the following:

· their best assessment of Putin’s power standing and state of health.

· likely military outcome in Ukraine.

· recommendations regarding further lethal, economic and humanitarian assistance to help the Ukrainians defeat the Russians.

· policy recommendations for keeping NATO allies united.

· a Memorandum of Notification aka “Presidential Finding” for realistic covert actions we can take to encourage opposition to Putin and the means to undercut his power and influence domestically.

· recommendations for furthering tightening the economic and financial chokehold on the Russian economy.

· what players are likely to succeed Putin in power?

· policy options on how to deal with a post-Putin Russia, to include stable control over nuclear weapons.

As for the latter, I would task the State Department to critically review actions we and our allies took after the collapse of the Soviet Union to ascertain what worked and what did not, and to draw up recommendations on how to engage with Moscow after Putin is gone. Key questions:

· what actions should we take now to encourage change, including in our public statements?

· how to respond to a potential geographic breakup of Russia’s regions?

· what should be our approach to allies on planning collectively for dealing a post-Putin Russia?

· identify key Russian constituencies we need to engage with to include political opposition, but also military and intelligence figures and business and economic players. How do we engage, when, and what is our message?

Many of the actions we took in the 1990s are worth dusting off and updating. A valuable resource is former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul’s 2005 analysis, “American Efforts at Promoting Regime Change in the Soviet Union and then Russia: Lessons Learned.” He outlines four factors which inhibited our efforts: 1) low priority by the U.S. government; 2) lack of a coherent U.S. strategy; 3) weak Russian democratic actors; and 4) Russia’s vastness.

These actions include re-establishing connections between U.S. civil society institutions and Russian counterparts — e.g., think tanks and academia, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, nongovernmental organizations promoting justice, democracy and human rights, labor organizations, etc. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s funding of pro-democracy efforts should also be resurrected in robust form. See McFaul’s paper for a fulsome description of U.S. efforts during those post-Soviet years.

Among the actions we should be taking now (and actually may be) are very sensitive ones. Select military and intelligence officials and others with the right contacts, should be tasked with discreetly reaching out to counterparts inside Russia’s military and security apparatus with essentially two messages: 1) Putin has set Russia on a self-destructive path; and 2) the United States is ready, willing and able to help Russia get on the right path and to reform itself. By doing so, when Putin leaves the scene, we will be well positioned to move quickly to re-engage with key Russian actors.

Preparing for a post-Putin era admittedly is a tall order in face of the challenges Ambassador McFaul outlines in his study, notably Russia’s stunted and weak civil society, and the sheer vastness of the country. But it must be done. Hints may be revealed in the Biden administration’s work in progress and soon to be released National Security Strategy, an unclassified document. In fact, I suggest a moniker for the effort: Operation Wind of Change.

James Bruno (@JamesLBruno) served as a diplomat with the U.S. State Department for 23 years and is currently a member of the Diplomatic Readiness Reserve. An author and journalist, Bruno has been featured on CNN, NBC’s Today Show, Fox News, Sirius XM Radio, The Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Huffington Post, and other national and international media.